Abstract. We propose a computationally feasible inference method in finite games of complete information. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show that such models are equivalent to a collection of moment inequalities that increases exponentially with the number of discrete outcomes. We propose an equivalent characterization based on classical combinatorial optimization methods that alleviates this computational burden and allows the construction of confidence regions with an efficient combinatorial bootstrap procedure that runs in linear computing time. The method can also be applied to the empirical analysis of cooperative and noncooperative games, instrumental variable models of discrete choice and revealed preference analysis. We propose an application to the determinants of long term elderly care choices.
Introduction
With the conjoined advent of powerful computing capabilities and rich data sets, the empirical evaluation of complex structural models with equilibrium data is becoming prevalent, particularly in the analysis of social networks and industrial organization. However, in such models, multiple equilibria are the norm rather than the exception. Though multiplicity of equilibria and identifiability of the model's structural parameters are conceptually distinct, the former often leads to a failure of the latter, thereby invalidating traditional inference methods. This is generally remedied by imposing additional assumptions to achieve identification, such as imposing an equilibrium selection mechanism or a refinement of the equilibrium concept. Manski (1993) and Jovanovic (1989) were among the first to advocate a new inference approach that dispenses with identification assumptions and delivers confidence regions for partially identified structural parameters. A large literature has developed on the general problem of inference on partially identified parameters defined as minimizers of objective functions or more specifically as solutions to moment inequality restrictions, following the seminal work of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) .
In structural estimation using equilibrium conditions, the partial identification approach was initially applied, as in Haile and Tamer (2003) , to achieve simple and robust inference from implications of the model in the form of a small number of moment inequalities. This partial identification approach was applied to inference in games by Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2003) , Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2004) , Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) , Jia (2008) among others. However, this approach brings only part of the empirical content of the model to bear on the estimation, resulting in unnecessary loss of informativeness. In models with multiple equilibria and no additional prior information, nothing is known of the equilibrium selection mechanism. If a particular equilibrium selection mechanism is posited, the model likelihood can be derived and inference based on it. Jovanovic (1989) characterizes compatibility of an economic structure with the true data generating process as the existence of some (unknown) equilibrium selection mechanism, for which the likelihood is equal to the true data generating mechanism. Berry and Tamer (2006) define the identified set as the collection of structural parameter values for which the structure is compatible with the data generating mechanism in the sense of Jovanovic (1989) . This definition of the identified set is not directly conducive to inference, as it involves an infinite dimensional (nuisance) parameter (the equilibrium selection mechanism). However, in the case of finite non cooperative games of complete information, Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show equivalence of the Jovanovic (1989) definition with a system of inequalities. Hence, they show that the empirical content of such models is characterized by a finite collection of moment inequalities.
A large literature has developed on inference in moment inequality models since the seminal contribution of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) . We discuss and review it in Section 3.
However, a major challenge in the framework of this paper is that the number of inequalities characterizing the empirical content of the model grows exponentially with the number of equilibrium strategy profiles. Hence the combinatorial optimization approach that we propose in this paper is to the best of our knowledge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically relevant incomplete economic structures. The growing literature on "inference with many moment inequalities" addresses theoretical issues relating to the case, where the number of inequalities grows with sample size and does not alleviate the computational burden mentioned here. This problem of exponential complexity goes a long way towards explaining the dearth of empirical studies using partial identification in such models. However, abandoning this partial identification approach would mean abandoning robust inference not only in non cooperative games of perfect information but also in large classes of models that share exactly the same feature, and fall into the framework of this paper. They include cooperative games, such as matching games and network formation games, revealed preference analysis of spacial preferences and matching markets and instrumental variable models of discrete choice.
The objective of this paper is to propose a combinatorial solution to this problem, where the number of inequality restrictions grows exponentially with the number of strategy profiles or discrete outcomes. Ekeland, Galichon, and Henry (2010) have shown that generic partial identification problems can be formulated as optimal transportation problems. Developing ideas in Galichon and Henry (2011) , we exploit the special structure of discrete choice problems and show that correct specification can be formulated as a problem of maximizing flow through a network, and that the identified set can be obtained from the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem. The dual problems of maximizing flow through a network and finding a minimum capacity cut are classics in combinatorial optimization and operations research, with applications in many areas such as traffic, communications, routing and scheduling; see, for example Schrijver (2004) for the theory and history, and Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993) for numerous applications. To our knowledge this is the first application of the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem to statistical inference for equilibrium models. We apply this powerful combinatorial method to the problem of constructing confidence regions for structural parameters. We construct a functional quantile for the bootstrap process using a linear computing time algorithm and replace the unknown empirical process by this quantile in the system of moment inequalities to obtain the least relaxation of the moment inequalities, hence maximum informativeness, while controlling the confidence level of the covering region. Since the procedure involves bootstrapping the empirical process only, it does not suffer from the problems of bootstrap validity in partially identified models described in Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) and Bugni (2010) . We illustrate and assess our procedure on a very simple full information game with 2 players and 3 strategies, easily derived equilibria and yet a large number of inequalities to characterize its empirical content (namely 127). We simulate the game under a variety of parameter values and assumptions on the data generating process and with explanatory variables. Finally, we illustrate the approach, the procedure and the interpretation of results on an application to the determinants of long term elderly care choices of American families.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We present a unified approach to inference in incomplete structural models.
2. We provide a simplified and insightful new proof for a characterization of the identified set.
3. We present a computationally efficient, combinatorial procedure that allows feasible inference in empirically relevant incomplete structural models. We demonstrate its practical efficiency in extensive simulations of a simple game.
4. We apply this methodology to an empirical example and demonstrate the type of econometric analysis and insights that it allows.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the general framework and the object of study. Section 2 derives the characterization of the identified set with the Min-Cut Max-Flow Theorem. Section 3 describes the combinatorial procedure to efficiently construct the confidence region. Section 4 contains the simulation evidence and Section 5 the empirical application. The last section concludes. Proofs are collected in an appendix.
1. Analytical framework 1.1. Model specification. We consider the following model specification.
where Y is an observable outcome variable, which takes values in a finite set
X is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables with domain X , ε is a vector of unobservable heterogeneity variables with domain Ξ ⊂ R l and θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R d is a vector of unknown parameters.
Finally, G : (X, ε) ⇒ G(X, ε; θ) is a multi-valued mapping. The random elements X, Y and ε are defined on a common probability space (Ω, F, P). The sample consists in n observational units i = 1, . . . , n, which are independent and identical in distribution. To each unit i is attached a vector
, only the first two elements of which shall be observed. For each potential outcome y ∈ Y, we denote by P (y|X) the conditional probability P(Y = y|X). If Z is a subset of Y, P (Z|X) will denote y∈Z P (y|X). It is important to emphasize here the fact that P (.|X) denotes the true outcome data generating process, which is unknown, but can be estimated from the data. It is not a function of the structural parameter vector and cannot be construed as the likelihood from the model. The vector of unobservable variables ε in the economic structure has conditional cumulative distribution function F (ε|X; θ) for some known function F parameterized by θ (the same notation is used for the parameters of the model correspondence and for the parameters of the error distribution to indicate that they may have common components). The economic structure is summarized by the multi-valued mapping G. A special case of specification (1.1) arises when G is a function, in which case model (1.1) is a nonlinear non separable single equation discrete choice model as in Chesher (2010) . Here, however, we entertain the possibility of G having multiple values arising from multiple equilibria, data censoring or endogeneity. G is entirely given by the economic structural model, up
to an unknown parameter vector θ.
The analytical framework, concepts and procedures proposed throughout the paper will be illustrated and discussed with the following simple example.
Example 1 (Partnership game). Our example is a simple non cooperative full information game of complementarities.
• Figure 1 for the case β = 0. Since we Table 1 . Payoff matrix for the partnership game. In each cell, the top expression is player 1's payoff and the bottom term is player 2's payoff.
Player 1:
Player 2 :
assume that ε has absolutely continuous distribution with respect to Lebesgue measure, we do not include zero probability predictions, such as {OO, OL} when ε 2 = c and ε 1 < −c for instance.
1.2. Object of inference. Model (1.1) has the fundamental feature that G is multi-valued (because of multiple equilibria in the example above for instance). For a given value of (X, ε, θ), the model predicts a set of possible outcomes G (X, ε; θ) . Only one of them, namely Y , is actually realized, but the economic structure is silent about how that particular Y was selected among G (X, ε; θ) . In other words, the economic structure holds no information about the equilibrium selection mechanism. If the true (unknown) equilibrium selection mechanism is denoted π 0 (y|ε, X), which is a probability on G (X, ε; θ) , then the likelihood of observation y can be written
and the true parameter θ 0 satisfies • Empirical analysis of games: As illustrated in Example 1, Model (1.1) applies to the empirical analysis of noncooperative games of perfect information (normal form games).
They include the classic entry game of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Berry (1992) as well as the social interaction game of Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) . Noncooperative games of private information make for a less compelling application of this framework as point identification conditions are more easily derived and justified than in their perfect information counterparts (see for instance Aradillas-Lopez (2010) and Bajari, Hahn, Hong, and Ridder (2011) for a discussion). Finally, some cooperative games can be analyzed and estimated within the present framework, in particular matching and social network formation games, where the equilibrium correspondence is characterized by pairwise stability.
Uetake and Watanabe (2011) present an empirical analysis of entry by merger, where the present inference procedure can be applied.
• Discrete choice models with endogeneity: Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011) show that instrumental variable models of discrete choice fall under model (1.1) and they use Theorem 1 of Galichon and Henry (2011) or equivalently Theorem 3.2 of Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) to characterize the identified set. The present work complements Chesher, Rosen, and Smolinski (2011) in proposing the first feasible inference procedure for such models.
• Revealed preference analysis: Henry and Mourifié (2011) apply the inference procedure proposed here to analyze voting behaviour from a revealed preference standpoint.
The same approach can be applied to revealed preference testing in matching markets as in Echenique, Lee, Shum, and Yenmez (2011) or the revealed preference approach to games taken in Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2004) .
Operational characterization of the identified set
As noted in Berry and Tamer (2006) , Definition 1 is not an operational definition of the identified set, as it includes the equilibrium selection mechanism as an infinite dimensional parameter. Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) show a characterization of the identified set with a finite collection of moment inequalities. In this section, we give an equivalent characterization of the identified set, whose proof is much simpler and relies on the Min-Cut MaxFlow Theorem, which brings classical efficient combinatorial optimization methods to bear on the problem. This will prove crucial for the feasibility of the inference procedure in realistic and relevant empirical examples.
First, we set out the main heuristic for the operational characterization of the identified set.
Model specification (1.1) is a discrete choice model, hence the set Y of outcomes is finite and the correspondence G takes only a finite number of values, which we label U = {u 1 , . . . , u J }. Each u is a set (possibly singleton) of outcomes in Y. Because the model is incomplete, it does not predict the probabilities of individual outcomes in Y, but it predicts the probability of each combination of equilibria listed in U. We denote these probabilities Q(u|X; θ) as they depend on the structural parameter value.
In most applications, it will be difficult to obtain closed forms for Q(u|X; θ). However, ε can be randomly generated. Given a sample (ε r ) r=1,...,R of simulated values, Q(u|X; θ) can be approximated by Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) propose an importance sampling procedure that greatly reduces the computational burden of this stage of the inference.
The simulation procedure is now standard and cannot be avoided if one wishes, as we do here, to exhaust the empirical content of the structural model. The model structure imposes a set of restrictions on the relation between the predicted probabilities of equilibrium combinations and the true probabilities of outcomes. For instance, the predicted probability Q({HH, LH, OL}|X; θ) in the above example cannot be larger than the sum P (HH) + P (LH) + P (OL) of probabilities of occurrence of each individual equilibrium in u, since Y is either HH, LH or OL, when u = {HH, LH, OL} is predicted. More generally, since P and Q are the marginals of the joint distribution of (Y, U ) given X, we must have for all u ∈ U :
{HH, OO}, {HH, LL, HL, LH}, {HH, LL, OO, HL, LH}, {HH, OO, HL}, {HH, HL, LO}, {LO}}.

The set Y of equilibrium strategy profiles (that may be observed) is {HH, HL, LH, LL, LO, OL
Note that Q(u|X; θ) may be strictly smaller than y∈u P (y|X) when some outcome y ∈ u also belongs to other combinations u that may arise under different values of ε, as its (marginal) probability P (y|X) must then be split between Q(u|X; θ) and the probabilities Q(u |X; θ) of such other combinations u ∈ U containing y. However, inequalities (2.1) do not exhaust the information in the structure. They may all be satisfied and yet the structure may be incompatible with the data generating process as the following example shows. Hence more inequalities will be needed as derived below.
Example 1 continued: In the partnership example with β = 0, suppose that the true equilibrium selection mechanism is such that
Extending this observation, consider a subset V ⊆ U and define
Then we must have
where the inequality is again due to the fact that some y ∈ V ∪ may also belong to some u ∈ V .
Since this inequality holds for every V ⊆ U, we must have
This inequality must also hold for every realization x of X in the domain X of the explanatory variables, implying that every θ in the identified set Θ I (P ) must satisfy
So far, we have shown implications of the model. It is far more difficult to show that these implication actually exhaust all the empirical content of the model, i.e., that they involve no loss of information and constitute sharp bounds. In Theorem 1 below, we will show this with an appeal to the classical Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem of combinatorial optimization, providing our characterization (2.2) of the identified set. We thereby provide, for the case of a finite set of possible outcomes, a new and simpler proof of the characterization of the identified set with a finite collection of inequalities, without the complicated apparatus of the theory of random sets. This allows us to emphasize the combinatorial optimization formulation of our inference problem, which is key to its tractable solution in empirically relevant instances. Theorem 1 below also provides an alternative characterization (2.3) of the identified set from the "dual" perspective of outcome subsets Z ⊆ Y, in addition to the preceding characterization (2.2) based on combination subsets V ⊆ U, with the notation
This alternative characterization may be useful in situations where the number of possible outcomes is much smaller than the number of possible combinations (as is the case in Example 1, where the number of equilibrium outcomes (cardinality of Y) is 7, so the corresponding number of inequalities to be checked is 2 7 −1 = 127, whereas the number of predicted equilibrium combinations (cardinality of U ) is 10, so the corresponding number of inequalities to check would be 2 10 − 1 = 1023). Finally, it is also equivalent to the characterization of the identified set first derived in Galichon and Henry (2011) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) , which we give in (2.4) in our notation. The identified set is derived as the set of values of c such that the 2 7 − 1 = 127 inequalities of the As illustrated in Example 1, even in simple examples, where the equilibria are very easy to compute, the exponential size of the characterization of the identified set is a severe computational burden that is best approached with combinatorial optimization techniques, as developed in the next section.
Theorem 1. The identified set is
3. Confidence region 3.1. Objective. We now turn to the problem of inference on Θ I (P ) based on a sample of obser-
. We seek coverage of the identified set with prescribed probability 1 − α, for some α ∈ (0, 1). It would be tempting to appeal to the large literature on inference in moment inequality models. This includes several proposals for the construction of confidence regions covering each point in the identified set, which are generally preferred on account of the fact that they may be more informative (although this may sometimes be misleading as pointed out in Henry and Onatski (2011) ). Such proposals include Section 5 of Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007) , Romano and Shaikh (2008) , Rosen (2008) , Galichon and Henry (2009) 
and Andrews and
Soares (2010) among others. All of the above propose to construct confidence regions by inverting specification tests. Hence, the confidence region is constructed through a search in the parameter space, with a computationally demanding testing procedure at each parameter value visited in the search. This becomes computationally infeasible for realistic parameter vector dimensions. With a reasonably precise grid search and 5 parameters (for example), the number of points to be visited is in the tens of billions. If the identified set is known to be convex, the search can be conducted from a central point with a dichotomy in polar coordinates, yet it remains computationally impractical to conduct a statistical procedure for each point in the search.
Hence, each parameter value in the search must be accepted or rejected based on a deterministic criterion. This means the significance of the confidence region must be controlled independently of the parameter value. This will automatically produce a confidence region that covers the identified set. Proposals for the construction of confidence regions covering the identified set include Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer (2007), Romano and Shaikh (2010) , Galichon and Henry (2006) and Bugni (2010) among others. These can be applied to realistic models defined by a small number of moment inequality restrictions. However, a major challenge in the framework of this paper is that the number of inequalities characterizing the empirical content of the model in Theorem 1 grows exponentially with the cardinality of Y, which in the case of games is the number of equilibrium strategy profiles (in the very simple partnership game of Example 1, the number of inequalities is 127). Hence the combinatorial optimization approach that we propose in this paper is to the best of our knowledge the only computationally feasible inference procedure for empirically relevant economic structures defined by finite games and other models of discrete choice with endogeneity.
Definition 3 (Confidence region). A confidence region of asymptotic level 1 − α for the identified set Θ I is defined as a sequence of regions
We seek coverage of the set of values of the parameter θ such that
values of x and all subset V of U. Q is determined from the model, but P is unknown. However, if we can construct random functions P n (A|x) that dominate the probabilities P (A|x) for all values of x and all subsets A of Y with high probability, then in particular,
for all values of x and all subsets V of U. There remains to control the level of confidence of the covering region, which is achieved by requiring that P n dominate P with probability asymptotically no less than the desired confidence level. Equivalently, when working from characterization (2.4), we impose the same requirement for dominated functions P n . Hence the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Let the random functions
Suppose now a value θ 0 of the parameter vector belongs to the identified set Θ I . Then, by
Theorem 1, for all x and V ⊆ U, Q(V |x; θ 0 ) ≤ P (V ∪ |x), so that with probability tending to no less
Theorem 2 (Confidence region). Under Assumption 1, the sets
define a confidence region of asymptotic level 1 − α for Θ I (according to Definition 3).
Theorem 2 has the fundamental feature that it dissociates search in the parameter space (or even possibly search over a class of models) from the statistical procedure necessary to control the confidence level. The upper probabilities P n can be determined independently of θ in a procedure that is performed once and for all using only sample information, i.e. fully nonparametrically.
Once the upper probabilities are determined, probabilities Q over predicted sets of outcomes are computed for particular chosen specifications of the structure and values of the parameter, and
such specifications and values are tested with inequalities defining Θ n (P n ). This dissociation of the statistical procedure to control confidence level from the search in the parameter space is crucial to the computational feasibility of the proposed inference procedure in realistic examples (i.e. sample sizes in the thousands, two-digit dimension of the parameter space and two-digit cardinality of the set of observed outcomes, as in the application to teen behavior in Soetevent and Kooreman (2007), or to entry in the airline market in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). The latter consider only equilibria in pure strategies, as we have until now. If equilibria in mixed strategies are also considered, as in Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) and in the family bargaining application below, we can appeal to results in Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011) and Galichon and Henry (2011) . In particular, Galichon and Henry (2011) show that if the game has a Shapley regular core (which is the case in the family bargaining application, by Lemma 2 of Galichon and Henry (2011) ), then the identified set is characterized by (2.3) of Theorem 1 with the caveat that the set function
where G(ε|X; θ) is now a set of mixed strategies, i.e. a set of probabilities on the set of outcomes, as opposed to a subset of the set of outcomes. Hence the methodology is be easily adapted, as in the application of Section 5.
3.2. Control of confidence level. We now turn to the determination of random functions satisfying Assumption 1. First, for each y ∈ Y, letP n (y|x) be the empirical analog (or more generally a nonparametric estimator) of P (y|x) andP n (A|x) = y∈AP n (y|x) for each A ⊆ Y. A simple way of achieving (3.1) is by considering the random variable
Denoting by c 4) and the desired result with P (A|x) =P n (A|x) + c α n . However, by construction, c α n is independent of A and x, so that the region obtained by plugging P (A|x) =P n (A|x) + c α n into (3.2) of Theorem 2 will be unnecessarily conservative. We propose, instead, to replace c α n by a function β n (A|x) of A and x, which we interpret as a functional quantile of the distribution of the random function P (A|x) −P n (A|x). Analogously to (3.4), we require it to satisfy
(3.5)
We first give a heuristic description of our proposed functional quantile before precisely spelling out the bootstrap procedure involved in approximating it. If X is finite, the random matrix P (A|x) − P n (A|x), with A ⊆ Y and x ∈ X has a finite population of possible realizations, at most one for each possible sample draw. These realizations can be ordered according to the maximum entry in the matrix max x∈X max A⊆Y [P (A|x) −P n (A|x)]. Now take all realizations that never exceed the (1 − α)-
, where β n (A|x) is the pointwise maximum over all realizations that never exceed c α n . This guarantees that the resulting confidence region obtained in (3.2) of Theorem 2 with P n (A|x) =P n (A|x) + β n (A|x) will be valid and will be contained in the region obtained with P n (A|x) =P n (A|x) + c α n (hence more informative than the latter). In case the conditioning variables are finitely supported, it is well known (see Singh (1981) and Bickel and Freedman (1981) ) that the nonparametric bootstrap version of c α n is a valid approximation, which in turns guarantees the validity of the bootstrap procedure described below. In case X has continuous components, Chernozhukov, Lee, and Rosen (2009) derive the asymptotic distribution of the supremum (over X ) of the conditional empirical process, but nothing is known of its nonparametric bootstrap approximation.
Definition 4 (Nonparametric Bootstrap). Let P * n denote probability statements relative to the bootstrap distribution and conditional on the original sample ( (Y 1 , X 1 
where the explanatory variable is not resampled and for each
In the bootstrap version of the problem, we are seeking functions β n satisfying
If there was a total order on the space of realizations of ζ * n , we could choose β n as the quantile of level 1 − α of the distribution of ζ * n . However, the ζ * n (·, X j )'s are random functions defined on 2 Y × {X 1 , . . . , X n }, hence there is no such total order. We propose to determine β n from a subset of B(1 − α) bootstrap realizations determined as follows (where x is the largest integer below x).
Step 1:
Step 2:
Step 3 The procedure is explained graphically in Figure 2 . βn is the pointwise maximum over the realizations that were not discarded (thick line).
Problem (3.6) can be solved by the following Bootstrap Realization Selection (BRS) algorithm:
Step 2: Let D be the set of indices b of the Bα largest w b . 
Proposition 1. The BRS algorithm determines an optimal solution to problem (3.6) in O(nB|Y|)
b 1 = w b ≥ [w] b 2 ≥ · · · ≥ [w]
. . , B} is NP-hard in the strong sense.
This result implies that unless P = N P , there exists no algorithm for this problem that runs in polynomial time. This is a severe computational drawback relative to the linear-time algorithm achieved with with BRS.
3.3. Search in the parameter space. Once the functional quantile has been computed, there remains to search in the parameter space for the values of θ that satisfy (3.2). As shown in the Lemma 1, the function to be optimized in characterization (2.2) of the identified set is supermodular.
Definition 5 (Supermodular function). A set function ρ : A → ρ(A) ∈ R is called supermodular (resp. submodular) if for all pairs of sets (A, B), ρ(A ∪ B) + ρ(A ∩ B) ≥ (resp. ≤) ρ(A) + ρ(B).
In the computation of Θ n (P n ), it may be desirable to require P n (V ∪ |x) to also be submodular as a function of V ⊆ U , so that the function to be maximized in (3.2) can be maximized using submodular optimization techniques. This can be achieved by adding the following additional linear constraints (see Schrijver (2004) 
The problem of checking whether θ is in the confidence regions can then be solved in polynomial time. Moreover, since submodular optimization has far ranging applications in all areas of operations research, many extremely efficient algorithms and implementations are readily available.
Simulation based on Example 1
We now illustrate and assess the performance of our procedure on the game described in Example 1. Throughout the experiment, we assume that (ε 1 , ε 2 ) is uniformly distributed on [−1/2, 1/2] 2 and J = (J 1 , J 2 ) is a vector of independent Bernoulli(1/2) random variables. True values for the parameters are indicated with a 0 subscript. We consider the following true parameter specifications:
(β 0 , c 0 ) = (0, 0) (point identified case) and (β 0 , c 0 ) = (0, 1/4) (which corresponds in some sense to the greatest possible indeterminacy). For the true data generating process, we consider two distinct equilibrium selection rules (which, like the true parameter values, are of course supposed unknown in the inference procedure). The first rule specifies that in case of multiplicity, all equilibrium strategy profiles in the equilibrium correspondence are selected with equal probability: we call this case "uniform selection". The second selection rule specifies that in case of multiplicity, the equilibrium with largest aggregate investment is selected; suppose for instance that the equilibrium correspondence takes the value {HH, HL, LO}, then equilibrium strategy profile HH is realized: we call this case "maximal selection". In the case of maximal selection with c 0 = 0.25, β 0 = 0 is assumed known a priori by the analyst performing inference (to avoid an unbounded identified set in the simulations).
In the remaining 3 cases, β 0 is unknown a priori. The experiment is run as follows. We calculate in each of the 4 cases above the distribution of the true data generating process. With the latter, we compute the identified set. In the point identified case, the identified set is equal to the true on the β coordinate. We then simulate 5000 samples of sizes n = 100, n = 500 and n = 1000 from this distribution and construct confidence regions for the identified set using lower probabilities P n (based on characterization 2.4), which turned out to have better coverage properties. We use 999 bootstrap replications for the first two sample sizes, and 399 bootstrap replications for n = 1000.
We consider confidence levels 90%, 95% and 99%. Coverage probabilities of the true value and of the identified set by the confidence region, as computed from the 5000 samples, are displayed in Table 2 for the data generating process obtained with maximal selection and Table 3 when going from n = 500 to n = 1000 and given the nonparametric procedure, there are doubt as to the accuracy of the procedure for n = 100. Finally, the coverage of the true value (as opposed to the whole identified set) is only marginally greater than the coverage of the whole identified set.
Application to long term elderly care decisions
We estimate the determinants of long term care option choices for elderly parents in American families. The model we use closely follows the one proposed by Engers and Stern (2002) The dependent variable is the care provision for the parent. The parent is asked to list children listed, the one providing the most time is designated the primary care giver. If the elderly parent lives in a nursing home, then the nursing home is the primary care giver. If no child is listed and the parent does not live in a nursing home, then the parent is designated as "living alone". Table 4 presents the list of variables used in the analysis. They include parent characteristics, characteristics Table 3 . Coverage probabilities of (α0, β0) and of the identified set by the confidence region, as computed from 5000 samples. The last column shows the level at which condition (3.5) is satisfied. Case where the data generating process is obtained with uniform selection. 5.1. The game. The observable choice of care option is modeled as in Engers and Stern (2002) as the outcome of a family bargaining game. We index family members as follows. Parent: 0, Firstborn child: 1 and Second born child: 2. The payoff to family member i, i = 0, 1, 2, is the sum of three terms. The first term V ij is the value to parent 0 and to child i of care option j, where j ∈ 1, 2 means child j becomes the primary care giver, j = 0 means the parent remains self-reliant and j = 3, the parent is moved to a nursing home. The matrix V = (V ij ) ij is known to both children and the Table 4 . List of variables.
parent. We suppose it takes the form
where W indicates the characteristics of the parents (DA and DM), and Z j indicates the characteristics of care option j (DS, DD1 and DD2) and X = (W, Z). θ = (γ ij , β ij , ψ ij ) is unknown to the analyst and the object of inference. The second term in the payoff results from the family bargaining process as follows. We assume that it is always in the interest of the parent to attend the family reunion. However, child i (i = 1, 2)
can refrain from participating in the meeting. By choosing not to participate, a member of the family agrees on whatever is decided but can neither assume the role of primary care giver, nor can he be involved in any side payment. Both children simultaneously decide whether or not to participate in the long term care decision. Suppose M is the set of children who participate. The option chosen is option j ∈ M ∪ {0, 3} which maximizes the participants's total utility i∈M V ij . It is assumed that participants abide by the decision and that benefits are then shared equally among parent and children participating in the decision through a monetary transfer s i , which is the second term in the children's payoff. The third term i in the payoff is a random benefit from participation, which is 0 for children who decide not to participate and distributed according to absolutely continuous distribution ν(.|θ) for each child who participates. All children observe the realizations of , whereas the analyst only knows its distribution. The Payoff matrix is given in Table 5 , where overall benefit shares w IJ i , i = 1, 2, I, J = N, P are defined and derived in the supplementary appendix. Multiple Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies are also derived in the appendix. Each equilibrium action profile results in a (almost surely) unique care option choice, hence for each participation shock , we can derive G( |X; θ) as the set of probability measures on the set of care options {0, 1, 2, 3} induced by mixed strategy profiles, which are probabilities on the set of participation profiles {N N, N P, P N, P P }. Table 5 . Payoffs for the family participation game.
5.2. Specification. We provide estimates for the following utility specification (an alternative with altruistic utility specification was estimated and results are reported in the supplementary material).
Recall that the columns indicate the options, in the following order {0, 1, 2, 3}, and the rows represent each member of the family, in the following order Parent, Child 1, Child 2. For example, the value the first born child (family member 1) living less than 30 minutes away from the parent's home attaches to the fact that she takes care of a non disabled, non-married parent is measured by β 11 , whereas for a disabled parent, it is β 11 + β ac .
Estimation methodology.
The methodology proposed in the paper allows the construction of the identified set based on the hypothetical knowledge of the true distribution of the data. As described in Section 3, we account for sampling uncertainty and control the level of confidence by constructing set functions A → P (A|X), which dominate P (A|X) (uniformly over A ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3}
and X) with probability 1 − α (the chosen level of confidence, here 0.95). We implement the method detailed in Section 3 (except that the pairs or cases bootstrap was used instead of the nonparametric bootstrap advocated above) with a number of bootstrap replications B = 2500.
Second, we obtain the model likelihood by simulating the valuation matrix and computing the Equilibrium correspondence from the payoff matrix, for given values of X and θ. The procedure is as follow. For a given X and θ,
• We generate and store R draws of ε from the distribution ν θ . Here, R = 5000 and ν θ is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ 2 ε , where (µ, σ 2 ε ) belong to the parameter θ.
• For each value ε r , we compute the valuation matrix V (X, ε r , θ) and the corresponding payoff matrix.
• Then, we determine the equilibrium correspondence G (X, ε; θ) from the analytical results derived in the preceding section. The Gambit software provides an alternative for computing numerically the set NE for more complex games.
• The last step of the simulation is to compute an estimator of the model likelihood L defined in (3.3) as follows:
Having constructed those two elements, the identified set comprises all values of θ such that for all observed values of the explanatory variables, the minimum over A ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3} of the function
is non negative, as explained in Section 3. We construct an n-dimensional grid to conduct the search over the parameter space. Each value of the parameter can be tested in a fraction of a second on a standard laptop, and a region of small dimensionality (1 to 4) can be constructed in a few hours, again on a standard laptop without parallel processing. However, We then obtain a constrained confidence region for the remaining parameters. For each value of mean and variance of the error term, we find a non empty intersection between the confidence region and the hyperplane defined by β 11 = 0. This means we fail to reject (at the 5% level) the null hypothesis that there is no additional constant disutility for a child to take care of an elderly parent. Since, this hypothesis is not rejected, we obtain a constrained confidence region for the remaining parameters. We then obtain confidence regions for different values of β 11 and discuss the latter's effect on the regions. We note that the Table 6 . Parameters Range for estimation of Specification 1 at β 11 = 0, β ac = −β m and for different values of the error terms and of β 00 .
on the subject. Namely:
(1) The existence of several problems with the parent's functional ability is a key determinant of the decision to enter a nursing home. β ah and β ac are both negative and can both be (very) large. The negative sign of β ah captures the fact that a parent's disability increases the value of care provided by the family or a specialized institution. In addition, β ac < 0 means that the disability entails a utility cost for the child if he is chosen as primary care
giver.
(2) Parameter β m associated with the parent living with a spouse is positive and large. This implies that married parents are more likely to remain self-reliant. In families where the parent is disabled, the effect of living with the spouse compensates the disutility of disability and preserves the incentive for parents to live at home.
(3) While we cannot rule out parents being indifferent to the gender or birth order of their primary care giver, estimation shows a tilt of the confidence interval toward positive values for both parameters, with a possible positive and large magnitude of the parameter α. In case µ = −1 and σ 2 u = 0.25, the data reveal that parents exhibit a preference for an older and for a female care giver.
(4) Children living more than 30 minutes from the parents are less likely to provide care than those living closer to the parents. Distance has a (possibly strong) disutility effect on children's incentives to participate in the care decision.
The shape of the confidence region also conveys a considerable amount of information. Figure 3 shows two dimensional dimensional projections and cuts of the confidence region for column 2 of Table 6 Figure 4 shows the effect of the variation of parameter β 11 on ψ s and α. Recall that β 11 represents a fixed cost or benefit for the child chosen as care giver. We observe negative relations between β 11 and ψ s , and β 11 and α.
Negative values of ψ s and α are only admissible for positive values of β 11 . Hence a model where parents exhibit no favoritism for a daughter and/or a firstborn, or favoritism for a son and/or a second born, will be consistent with our data if and only if there exist a strictly positive constant benefit for a child to be caregiver.
Conclusion
We have considered the problem of statistical inference in incomplete partially identified structural models, such as models of discrete choice with interactions and other forms of endogeneity.
A characterization of the identified set for structural parameters was given, with an appeal to a classical theorem in combinatorial optimization, the Max-Flow Min-Cut Theorem, thereby emphasizing the optimization formulation of the problem of inference in such models. Finally, we have shown how to apply combinatorial optimization methods within a bootstrap procedure in order to compute informative confidence regions very efficiently, hence feasibly in empirically relevant appli-
cations. An application of the methodology was carried out on a family bargaining example and it was shown that most findings in the literature on the determinants of long term elderly care by American families were supported in this more robust framework, where the effects of interaction are accounted for. This procedure applies to very general classes of models and its efficiency and coverage properties could no doubt be improved, when tailored to more specific applications. In particular, the application to matching games and revealed preference testing of stability in match- such that Y has probability mass P (y|X), y ∈ Y, U has probability mass Q(u|X; θ), u ∈ U, and P(Y ∈ U |X) = 1. This is equivalent to the existence of non negative weights π and only if y ∈ u. All nodes u 1 , . . . , u J in U are connected to the sink T . To each edge is attached a capacity, which is the maximum amount that can flow through it. Capacity is constrained to P (y|X)
between S and node y. Capacity is unconstrained (i.e. infinite) between node y and node u such that y ∈ u. The capacity of edges between a node u and the sink T is constrained to Q(u|X; θ).
We have shown that θ ∈ Θ I if and only if the maximum flow in the network described above is equal to 1. We now appeal to a classical result in combinatorial optimization called the Max-Flow
Min-Cut Theorem, see for instance Theorem 10.3 page 150 of Schrijver (2004) . A cut through a network is partition of the nodes into two sets separating the source from the sink. The capacity of a cut is defined as the sum of the capacities of edges in the network that cross the cut from the source side to the sink side. Let a cut be defined by the set V of elements of U and the set Z of elements of Y on the sink side of the cut. Since the capacity of an edge from y to u such that y ∈ u is infinite, the cut defined by V and Z has finite capacity if and only if y ∈ u and u ∈ V jointly imply y ∈ Z. Such a cut has capacity C(Z, V ) = y∈Z P (y|X)+ u∈U \V Q(u|X; θ) = y∈Z P (y|X)+1− u∈V Q(u|X; θ) . A cut has minimum capacity if no node can be moved between the source side of the cut and the sink side of the cut without increasing capacity, hence if y / ∈ u and u ∈ V jointly imply y / ∈ Z, hence if Z = V ∪ = {u : u ∈ V }. Therefore, the capacity of a minimum Proof of Lemma 1. Take an x ∈ X . Take any u ∈ U and V ⊆ U\{u}. We have P ([V ∪ {u}] ∪ |x) − P (V ∪ |x) = y∈ v∈V ∪{u} v P (y|x) − y∈ v∈V v P (y|x) = y∈u\V ∪ P (y|x) = P (u\V ∪ |x), which is non-increasing in V , hence the result.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a value θ ∈ Θ I , by Theorem 1, we have sup x∈X max V ⊆U (Q(V |x; θ) − P (V ∪ |x)) ≤ 0. Under Assumption 1, sup x∈X max V ⊆U (P (V ∪ |x)) − P n (V ∪ |x)) ≤ 0, with limiting probability larger than 1 − α. Hence, with probability at least 1 − α, sup x∈X max V ⊆U (Q(V |x; θ) − P n (V ∪ |x)) ≤ 0, and thus θ ∈ Θ I (P n ). Blum, Floyd, Pratt, Rivest, and Tarjan (1973) ).
Proof of Proposition 2. The problem corresponds to the following decision problem: given an n × m matrix H, an integer k and a target value t, can one find a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that |S| ≥ k and m i=1 max j∈S H ij ≤ t? Denote (H, k, t) an instance of the latter problem. Consider the wellknown NP-hard decision problem CLIQUE (see for instance section 4.8 page 43 of Schrijver (2004)): given a graph G = (V, E) and an integer q satisfying 2 ≤ q ≤ |V |, does there exist a subset Q ⊆ V such that |Q| ≥ q and for all i, j ∈ V , ij ∈ E (i.e. Q is a clique). To any instance (G, q) of the problem CLIQUE, we associate an instance (H, k, t) of our decision problem, where lines of H corresponds to vertices of G (elements of V ), columns of H corresponds to edges in G (elements of E) and H ij = 1 if vertex i belongs to edge j, and 0 otherwise. For any subset S ⊆ E of edges in G, we have for all i ∈ E, max j∈S H ij = 1 if i belongs to at least one element of S, and 0 otherwise. Hence, i∈E max j∈S H ij is the number of vertices that belong to at least one edge in S. Define k = q(q − 1)/2 and t = q. Then, a set S of k edges involves at least (hence exactly) q vertices if and only if S is the set of edges of a CLIQUE. Hence the answer to the decision problem (H, k, t) thus defined is YES if and only if G contains a CLIQUE with q vertices. Since CLIQUE is NP-complete, it follows that our decision problem is NP-hard. 
